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Lessons not learned: Insider threats in
pathogen research
By Derrin Culp | 3 April 2013
In the classic film Dr. Strangelove, Brig. Gen. Jack D. Ripper was the ultimate insider threat. As
the nuclear-armed B-52s that Ripper unilaterally dispatched proceeded toward their Soviet
targets, the American president confronted Air Force Gen. Buck Turgidson in exasperation:
"When you instituted the human reliability tests, you assured me there was no possibility of such
a thing ever occurring." To which Turgidson replied, "Well, I don't think it's quite fair to condemn a
whole program because of a single slip-up, sir."
Turgidson's rejoinder is similar to the response of much of the US microbiology community --
scientists, funding agencies, and regulators alike -- to the Justice Department's conclusion that
the infamous 2001 anthrax mailings were the work of an insider. Since 2008, when investigators
led by the FBI's Washington Field Office identified Bruce E. Ivins, an Army civilian research
scientist, as the sole perpetrator, the collective response has been to minimize discussion of the
problem, indulge in wishful thinking, and enact cosmetic changes.
Within a year of the Justice Department's finding, a US National Research Council (NRC)
committee and the federal government's standing biosecurity advisory panel both had examined
the issue of insider threats in pathogen research. Those panels concluded that existing
procedures to keep tabs on scientists who work with dangerous pathogens are sufficient. Both
determined that intrusive monitoring of microbiologists engaged in unclassified research would
not necessarily increase protection against insider threats and rejected broad adoption of
procedures that scientists and military personnel who work with nuclear weapons and fissile
material must endure, such as random testing for alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, or amphetamines;
observation of off-duty behavior; video monitoring of laboratory activity; annual psychological
assessments; or mandatory privacy waivers to allow supervisors to review mental health
treatment records. Neither panel's report discussed the risk of mass casualties from an insider
threat or considered that such risks might lead to different conclusions about intrusive screening
and monitoring.
The panels also concluded that laboratories can successfully manage insider threat risk
primarily by creating a supportive environment that somehow will induce emotionally or mentally
troubled researchers with malevolent intentions to voluntarily give up their lab privileges before
they do harm. Likewise, this supportive environment will enable managers with minimal mental
health training and expertise to identify such researchers even if they don't reveal themselves.
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Since the conclusion of these two major reviews, all but a handful of the articles and opinion
pieces addressing pathogen research in leading science and biosecurity journals and blogs and
in major US newspapers, as well as all biosecurity pronouncements from US government
regulators and research funding agencies, have been silent on the issue of insider threats or
ignored the dissenting perspective that aggressive monitoring of scientists' mental and
emotional health could have prevented the anthrax mailings and should be part of routine
supervision.
In October 2012, the government updated the regulations -- put in place in 2002 after the anthrax
mailings -- that control the possession, use, and transfer of dangerous biological agents and
toxins known as Select Agents. Although the new regulations expressly address the issue of
insider threats, they embrace the expert panels' recommendations and preserve a largely
hands-off posture by regulators.
In 2012, the federal government also issued a new biosecurity policy designed to increase
routine scrutiny of risky pathogen research by federal funding agencies. The policy says nothing
about insider threats. Likewise, a companion policy on institutional oversight of possibly risky
research, as well as a framework for guiding US government funding decisions on H5N1
research -- both released in February of this year -- ignored the insider issue altogether. On this
subject, a March 18, 2013 Congressional Research Service report said only that "a deliberate
release by a disgruntled or disturbed laboratory worker" is a concern to "some experts."
A culture of responsibility. In 2011, the Center for Biosecurity, a leading biosecurity think tank,
summarized the microbiology profession's "right answer" to insider threats: "enlightened
leadership, trust, and openness … making sure that laboratory leaders have the time,
responsibility, and training to be able to observe and evaluate what is happening in their
laboratories day to day." This approach relies almost entirely upon researcher self-policing and
gives lab managers few rights to explore researchers' emotional and mental health. It's no
surprise that scientists would favor it.
Along the same lines, reports in 2009 and 2011 by the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) and a 2009 book by a National Research Council panel exhorted
laboratories to cultivate a "culture of responsibility with respect to biosecurity," meaning a work
environment that encourages discussion of researchers' security obligations, reliance on self-
and peer reporting of physical and emotional health issues, and non-punitive, non-stigmatizing
mechanisms for troubled researchers to temporarily surrender their access to pathogens.
The NSABB and NRC also reviewed the scientific evidence on the efficacy of credit checks,
polygraphs, high-level security clearances, examination of pharmacy and psychiatric records,
psychological tests, and random drug and alcohol testing in detecting insider threats. With the
exception of random drug testing and investigation of "sudden unexplained affluence" (which the
NRC panel deemed worth considering where research involves the most transmissible and
lethal organisms), the panels did not find enough evidence to justify what they perceived as the
potential negative consequences of employing those techniques. Ironically, the two panels
provided little evidence of the effectiveness of the "culture of responsibility" that they embraced
enthusiastically.
The reports speculated that expanded use of intrusive techniques might put a chill on US
infectious disease research by discouraging talented microbiologists from pursuing such work
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or inducing them to relocate to countries with more lenient regulation. Such techniques would,
they feared, impose additional costs on laboratories, run afoul of various federal and state
privacy laws, and create an unacceptable risk of incorrectly flagging innocent researchers.
Finally, the NRC panel asserted that monitoring that may make sense for nuclear research
doesn't make sense in microbiological research because the two types of science are
fundamentally different.
Unexamined alternatives. Neither the NRC panel nor the NSABB adequately challenged its
own assumptions. For example, the privacy laws currently on the books are not immutable. With
sufficient political will, Congress and state legislatures could relax those constraints in order to
permit more intrusive screening and monitoring. Although the NRC panel conceded that
polygraphs might have a deterrent effect regardless of the tests' accuracy, it did not attempt to
assess the magnitude of such an effect. NSABB noted that "some psychological profiling is
conducted for certain elite military units" and that "psychological tests are also routinely used as
a component of the employment screening process … for airline pilots or within the nuclear
industry," but it did not discuss why those sectors employ psychological profiling or explain why
those rationales don't apply to pathogen research.
The NRC panel did not consider that it might not be desirable to provide innocent scientists
absolute protection from false suspicion when the negative consequences of failing to identify a
genuine risk are great. Nor did it make a compelling case that the inherent differences between
pathogen and nuclear research necessitate much less intense and intrusive screening and
monitoring of microbiologists. Nobody has explained why it is acceptable for the US Army and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to subject their microbiologists to periodic random
drug tests and annual psychological assessments, respectively, but unacceptable to do the
same with university and private-sector scientists conducting high-risk pathogen research.
Finally, there is hardly any evidence to justify concerns about a "brain drain" away from US
infectious disease research or to indicate that the onerous restrictions imposed on nuclear
weapons scientists for decades have significantly impeded recruitment or retention. A 2009
report on biological safety and security from the Defense Science Board asserted that although
the US government agencies that administer the nuclear weapons complex and gather
electronic intelligence engage in "extremely intrusive monitoring," those efforts are widely
accepted by the people who work there.
The Ivins case. Within a year of Bruce Ivins' death in 2008, a federal judge authorized an
independent panel of six psychiatrists and three other experts to review the scientist's court-
sealed psychiatric records. This Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel concluded that had the Army
examined those records, as it was legally empowered to do, it would have determined -- long
before 2001 -- that Ivins should not have access to anthrax. According to the panel, the anthrax
mailings "could have been anticipated -- and prevented." The panel's review found that over the
20 years preceding the anthrax mailings, Ivins "had committed repeated acts of breaking and
entering as well as burglary without having been caught," and that he had disclosed this only to
his personal psychiatrists. Furthermore, Ivins had "cultivated a persona of benign eccentricity
that masked his obsessions and criminal thoughts" and was "exploitive and manipulative."
Ivins repeatedly authorized the Army to obtain and review his medical and psychiatric treatment
records. According to the panel, however, the Army neither examined Ivins' mental health
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records nor paid close attention to his daily behavior. The expert panel urged organizations to
retain the right to examine such records, to keep that access as broad as possible, to use it
even in the "absence of specific symptoms or diagnoses," and to withhold access to pathogens
from scientists who don't renew privacy waivers. However, the national press and microbiology
journals paid little attention to the audacious conclusions.
The H5N1 controversy. During the winter of 2011 and 2012, Americans witnessed a prime-
time discussion about research on the avian flu virus, known to scientists as H5N1. This
organism kills millions of birds annually but, unlike the seasonal flu that makes so many people
miserable every winter, H5N1 rarely infects humans. When it does, however, it is incredibly
lethal; the World Health Organization estimates that 59 percent of all human cases end in death.
The US National Institutes of Health funded two unclassified studies to better understand the
likelihood that the H5N1 virus might naturally mutate in ways that would make it more
transmissible among humans and, therefore, much more dangerous. When it appeared that at
least one of the studies had created in the lab a strain of H5N1 that might be able to spread
easily among humans, numerous commentators weighed in on whether publishing the studies
would be tantamount to giving terrorists the blueprints for a biological weapon of mass
destruction. Scientists and scholars not prone to hyperbole or histrionics indicated that, under
certain conditions, the intentional release of a similarly modified virus could cause deaths in the
tens or even hundreds of millions. The NSABB, which historically has been strongly opposed to
publication restrictions, recommended unanimously that science journals limit what they
published, arguing that "the deliberate release of a transmissible highly pathogenic influenza
A/H5N1 virus would be an unimaginable catastrophe." The controversy was so intense that virus
researchers around the world adopted an open-ended moratorium on similar research, which
they maintained for a year.
The risk from "terrorists" dominated the H5N1 discussion, and the potential for scientists to do
harm barely lit up the radar -- as if that hadn't happened in a spectacular way just a decade
earlier. One of the few people who thought it was germane to worry about researchers using
their own findings in malevolent ways was Australian immunologist Ian Ramshaw: "I'm not so
worried about bioterrorism. It's the disgruntled researcher who is dangerous." Rutgers
microbiologist Richard Ebright, commenting at the time on the proposed Select Agent updates,
wrote that failure to mandate video monitoring, a two-person rule, and psychological
assessments for scientists working with the most dangerous pathogens "would represent a
failure to learn lessons from the 2001 anthrax mailings [and] to address the ‘insider threat'
responsible for the 2001 anthrax mailings." But that perspective was virtually invisible in the
H5N1 debate.
When a major journal finally published one of the H5N1 studies, it included six related
commentaries, but the closest any of them came to mentioning insider threats was to note that
"each additional laboratory and individual worker adds to the risk of accidental or malicious
release." For the rest of 2012, as the moratorium continued, the dozens of articles that
considered the future of H5N1 research focused overwhelmingly on the risks of accidental
release of modified microbes and occasionally on the deliberate release by terrorists. None
raised the risk of deliberate release by an insider or invoked the 2001 anthrax mailings.
New rules. The federal agencies that administer the Select Agency Regulations announced
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changes to those rules in October 2012, following a yearlong public comment process. Besides
designating a new list of Select Agents -- including the most dangerous pathogens, known as
Tier 1 -- the updates imposed new security requirements ostensibly intended to enhance labs'
ability to stymie insider threats. In reality, though, they strongly favor researchers' preferences for
a light touch by regulators.
The updates don't mandate any additional screening or monitoring. Originally, the updates
proposed a requirement that the compliance manager have "the appropriate training and
expertise" to fulfill his or her responsibilities (which include managing insider threat risks, among
others). But this obligation did not survive the comment period. Instead, the final rule instructs
federal regulators to continue judging performance based on efficacy in implementing
regulations; in effect, as long as nothing goes seriously wrong, regulators can conclude that the
compliance manager is qualified. This is a glaring abdication of regulatory responsibility, given
the potential harm from a compliance manager's failure to deal properly with insider threats.
The updates require laboratory security plans to explicitly address how the compliance manager
will learn of and report potentially criminal activity to law enforcement agencies. For labs
handling the most dangerous pathogens, the security plans also must describe how the
compliance manager will decide when to grant, suspend, or terminate researcher access to
Select Agents. To help regulated labs comply with these new requirements, the federal
government issued a guidance document on how to screen and monitor researchers and other
employees to determine who may have access to Tier 1 pathogens, and how to identify insider
threats. The guidance document is extremely long on process but short on actual advice. It lists a
number of factors that might warrant concern, but offers no guidance on how to interpret or react
to them. It suggests that the lab official who approves researchers for access to these select
agents have "human resources expertise and experience," but it does not suggest any role for
medical or mental health professionals. It cedes most critical decisions to the sole judgment and
discretion of laboratory management.
The guidance document also attempts to remove from consideration the idea that an insider
threat could arise from a researcher's chronic emotional or mental health issues and that
psychological screening might be worthwhile. It states: "The FBI Amerithrax investigation
identified a US scientist as the most likely perpetrator" (emphasis added) of the anthrax
mailings, when in fact the Justice Department was unequivocal: "Ivins, alone, mailed the anthrax
letters." Its examples of insider threats include someone who pretends to be a legitimate
researcher; someone who is the victim of coercion or manipulation; and someone who does
harm after experiencing a "significant life-changing event." None of these archetypes is
consistent with what the expert psychiatric panel's report revealed about Bruce Ivins and the
factors -- including a lifelong preoccupation with revenge -- that may have motivated him to mail
anthrax.
No exemptions. What if, instead of mailing anthrax spores, a microbiologist had released an
aerosolized and highly transmissible pathogen near the ticket counters and security lines at
Washington's Reagan National Airport, ultimately causing 5,000 deaths instead of five? Would
the prescription for addressing the insider threat risk be the same as the current approach? We
don't have to get anywhere near the seven-digit fatality numbers mentioned during the H5N1
controversy to be fairly certain that a "culture of responsibility" and regulatory delegation of
screening and monitoring choices to scientists and their laboratories would be deemed a naïve
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and utterly inadequate level of protection. Something akin to the Department of Energy's Human
Reliability Program -- one of those "extremely intrusive" regimes cited by the Defense Science
Board -- would be much more likely.
Microbiologists' claims to an exemption from intrusive personal scrutiny in unclassified research
are motivated by sincere (and perhaps even correct) beliefs that restricting them would impede
scientific progress and unnecessarily constrain the abundant benefits that their work otherwise
would deliver to humankind. But those claims also arise from understandable concerns for
personal privacy and dignity.
Identifying the extremely high-risk types of pathogen research (both classified and unclassified)
for which the government should mandate more oversight -- and picking the right mix of
screening and monitoring techniques -- would undoubtedly be a complex and imperfect
undertaking. Even with decades of evidence about what has and has not worked in nuclear
research, intelligence gathering, and classified microbiological research environments,
mistakes would be made and some blameless scientists might be faulted. Ultimately, though,
microbiologists can't be exempt from such scrutiny. They lost that privilege when they acquired
the ability -- or merely the potential -- to generate mass casualties.
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